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The article by Danziger and colleagues in this issue of Neuron evaluates empathy in a unique population—
individuals with congenital insensitivity to pain. As such, it provides insights into the brain’s ability to evaluate
others’ feeling to observed pain without having a specific sensory experience of pain itself.How can one have an emotional response
to pain through empathetic feelings for
a sensation that these patients have
apparently never experienced? Empathy
(from the Greek empatheia) is commonly
defined as ‘‘feeling or expressing emotion
for another and thus the ability to under-
stand the experience of another individual
via cognitive and affective processing.’’
Prior research in healthy subjects has
suggested that empathy for pain may
effectively produce activation in pain
neural circuits of an individual observing
another person’s pain (for example,
Singer et al., 2004). In the paper by Dan-
zinger and colleagues, published in this
issue of Neuron (Danzinger et al., 2009),
the authors approach this question by
examining fMRI activation for empathy
in patients with congenital insensitivity
to pain (CIP) who presumably have no
prior experience of pain sensation.
The segregation of neural processing of
pain in CIP raises interesting issues in
pain neurobiology. Among these is the
general issue of whether pain (and other
aversive stimuli) may be interpreted in
a similar manner to what we currently
understand in patients with chronic pain
and healthy individuals. For example, are
there common circuits that are emotional
or affective components of neural pro-
cessing of pain or aversive stimuli that
are part of an interpretive network that
does not require specific sensory input?
The authors use two approaches: (1)
measures of fMRI responses viewing
body parts in painful situations and (2)
responses to viewing facial expressions
of pain in a group of patients with con-
genital insensitivity to pain and controls
(C-group). For body parts, the main find-
ings report activations in the CIP-group
and the C-group in similar regions,including superior frontal gyrus, anterior
insula, parietal lobule, post-central gyrus,
cerebellum, and thalamus, with differ-
ences noted for medial frontal gyrus and
posterior and mid-insula, while the
caudate shows no significant activations
found in the CIP-group. However, for
facial expressions, differences were noted
in the cingulate cortex. Furthermore,
when brain responses were contrasted
with the empathy trait, the pregenual
anterior cingulate was found to activate
to a greater extent in the CIP-group, and
for facial expressions the posterior cingu-
late was activated more in the CIP-group.
The common brain activations reported
may be interpreted in terms of the
stimulus-response processing of neural
circuits as they relate to evaluating
empathy in the absence of any experi-
ence of feeling pain in the CIP-group. As
summarized in Figure 1, pain processing
may be simplistically divided into three
domains that are interconnected and/or
influence each other through direct or
indirect pathways. Most of the regions
commonly activated in the CIP-group
and C-group are shown in bold in the
figure and include regions thought to be
involved in emotional processing of pain.
Those areas that seem to be specific to
the CIP-group are in capital letters
(Figure 1, bottom). The commonly acti-
vated regions suggest common process-
ing in some regions in the CIP-group
(who have not had the experience of
pain but may cognitively appreciate the
concept) and C-group. The results there-
fore suggest a generalized or common
circuitry for emotional processing that
has common regions of activation. It
would seem that for a pain-specific
response, a ‘‘pain memory’’ would need
to be present in order for subjects toNeuron 61have an emotional response even if there
was no prior sensory response to pain
stimuli. Imagining or observing suffering
in others by CIP patients surely must be
part of their ‘‘experience.’’ Indeed, some
studies have indicated that brain activa-
tion may follow non-body stimuli, sug-
gesting that pain and other negative
emotions may overlap (Benuzzi et al.,
2008). Alternatively, mirror neurons may
play a role in the regions commonly acti-
vated, since these provide a basis for
evaluating the actions of others (Iacoboni
and Mazziotta, 2007).
Although some of the commonly acti-
vated brain regions are involved in
emotional processing of pain (Becerra
et al., 2001; Apkarian, 2008), it is the
differences in activation in regions (medial
frontal gyrus and posterior insula and
caudate for body parts and the cingulate
[mid and posterior]) noted in the current
study that are perhaps of greater interest.
These differences in brain activation are
present in the CIP-group, although the
behavioral measures of pain interpreta-
tion show no difference. The latter may
relate to the sensitivity or lack thereof of
behavioral indices versus brain process-
ing (imaging). The four regions (medial
prefrontal, posterior insula, posterior and
mid-cingulated, and caudate) that are
differentially activated in the CIP-group
may provide some interesting insights
into the processing of empathy. The
medial frontal gyrus is involved in regula-
tion of cognitive control. The mid- and
posterior cingulate gyrus is involved in
conscious awareness and might also
be involved in processing self-relevant
emotional and nonemotional informa-
tion. The posterior insular cortex, some-
times termed the ‘‘sensory insula,’’ may
be involved in perception and object, January 29, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 153
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PreviewsFigure 1. Pain Processing with and without Afferent Fiber Inputs
(Top) Schematic of differences in brain regions involved in sensory, emotional, and cognitive processing in the intact (control) versus the patient group (who have
no pain fibers).
(Bottom) Schematic of results obtained in the study. No pain sensation as a result of lack of pain fibers indicates that the normal experience to sensory regions and
adaptive or evaluative changes in emotional regions would not be present. In empathy, emotional regions (shown in capitals on the right) are those shown to
differentiate from the controls (see text).recognition. Thus, alterations in process-
ing observed in these regions may relate
to the lack of prior experience of pain
perception. The basal ganglia have been
shown to be involved in pain from some
of the early fMRI imaging studies in hu-
mans (Becerra et al., 1999) but have taken
on a greater role in our understanding of
behaviors in general, including pain pro-
cessing. The basal ganglia are involved
in many neuronal pathways (i.e., receive
information from the cortex and thalamus
and project to the frontal lobe regions)
having emotional, motivational, associa-
tive, and cognitive functions (Herrero
et al., 2002). For example, in pain avoid-
ance, neurons are activated in the caudate
and anterior cingulate regions. Although
no connectivity studies were performed,
they may be of interest, since these
regions are involved in cognitive-emo-
tional processing andmayhaveboth func-
tional and structural connectivity.
Pain is a complex experience. As
definedbythe InternationalAssociation for
the Study of Pain (IASP), pain is ‘‘. an
unpleasant sensory and emotional experi-
ence associated with actual or potential
tissue damage or described in terms
of such damage.’’ Responses to pain
may perhaps be simplistically grouped
into sensory-discriminative and affective-
motivational. While most would argue
that the notion of a medial ‘‘emotional
pathway’’ and a lateral ‘‘discriminative
pathway’’ is a simplification of pain projec-
tions and pain integration within the brain,
it has been difficult to separate these
contributions in terms of how our brains
integrate ‘‘the pain experience’’ both in
acute chronic pain states.Weare unaware
of any literature indicating anatomical
abnormalities in brain regions in CIP
patients aside from one report indicating
mild volume loss based on CT scans.
Clinical data implicate a segregation of
sensory and emotional components of
pain, suggesting the ability for emotional
pain to be experienced in the absence of
sensory components of pain and vice
versa. For example, following strokes
involving the insular cortex, there is a
reduced sensitivity for the perception of
pain (Scho¨n et al., 2008), which is of154 Neuron 61, January 29, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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ceptive nociceptive specific pathway in
monkeys to the posterior insula. In addi-
tion, lesions that produce loss of pain
sensation include post-central gyrus
involvement that is thought to be related
to cortical sensory loss without post-
stroke pain. Reports of asymbolia (a form
of aphasia in which the significance of
signs and symbols is not appreciated) for
pain have suggested that insular damage
may play a critical role in the development
of the syndrome by interrupting connec-
tions between sensory cortices and the
limbic system.Patients reportedademon-
strated lack of withdrawal and absent or
inadequate emotional responses to pain-
ful stimuli applied over the entire body,
as well as to threatening gestures. In a
right-sided stroke patient, a dissociation
of discriminative and affective compo-
nents of pain perception was reported
(Ploner et al., 1999) in which the affective
component was still present, but the
sensory/discriminative component was
absent. Finally, in a patient following an
anterior capsulotomy of the medial
prefrontal cortex, pain intensity and the
unpleasantness of noxious stimuli were
reduced. These examples indicate the
importance of specific regions of pain
processing in the brain that may play
a role in the separation of intensity versus
emotional processing; the differences in
brain activation patterns (noted above)
provide further insights of the empathetic
response to others’ pain.
Can one have an emotional response to
pain without having experienced pain?
Can we remember pain? Can we learn
pain? How is it possible for individuals
who apparently have never felt pain to
show responses to empathetic pain? In
some ways, this is akin to the relatively
little we know about dreaming about
pain (unrelated to an anesthesia). In these
circumstances, there is no sensory input,
but there seems to be a prominent
response to the affective component of
pain (Nielsen et al., 1993). In experimen-
tally induced pain during sleep, dreams
are associated with strong emotion.
Some have suggested that dream-state
experiences such as pain, touch, heat,
odor, and sound would compromise vigi-
lance, and their occurrence during sleep
has been disfavored by natural selection
(Symons, 1993). Are the same neural
networks involved as in CIP patients?
Finally, given the nature of differences
in congenital insensitivity to pain and
potentially different mechanisms, this
patient group provides opportunities
for the evaluation of genetic variants
known in this disorder. Currently, five
subtypes have been previously reported
(see Dyck et al., 1983). Most notably,
a SCN9A/Nav 1.7 gene channelopathy
causes congenital insensitivity to experi-
ence pain (Cox et al., 2006). In this re-
gard, animal models of pain insensitivity
are now available, including species
that have selective pain insensitivity to
inflammatory pain. Transgenic mice
lacking certain genes (e.g., mice lack-
ing SCN10A the gene encoding the
voltage-gated sodium channel NaV1.8)
have complete insensitivity to cold pain.
These genetic mutations may alter
hedonic appreciation for a sensation
not felt and, therefore, hedonic or affec-
tive interpretation based on learning an
unfelt sensation. Given that mice may
display empathy (modulation of pain
sensitivity is produced by exposure to
cagemates where observation of a
cagemate in pain altered pain sensitiv-
ity across modalities [Langford et al.,
2006]), the potential evaluation of knock-
outs may provide further insights into this
domain. Nevertheless, imaging studies of
patients with genetic mutations affecting
pain offer unique insights into sensory
and emotional processing of pain in the
brain. This paper clearly highlights this
approach.
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